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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20653
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
J. D. COLLIER,
Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Deirdre A. Gorman, attorney for the defendant, is submitting
this brief in accordance with Anders v. California/ 386 U.S. 738,
87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 LEd.2c 493, (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).
The defendant initiated this appeal pursuant to a writ of
habeas corpus filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

In that habeas corpus writ, he outlined

the issues which he wished to raise on appeal.

These issues are

as follows:
1.

A violation of trial court order that witnesses be

excluded and not talk among themselves.
2.

Suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor.

This evidence includes physical evidence, clothing worn by
defendant, expended shell casings, evidence concerning the exact
time when defendant was shot, evidence concerning the identity of
the officer who shot the defendant, and failure to produce
evidence as to findings of blood and urine samples taken from the
defendant immediately after his arrest.
3.

The use of perjured testimony by the prosecutor.
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4.

Violations of the defendant's Sixth Amendment's right to

confront and cross-examine confidential informants.
5.

Ineffective assistance of counsel based or the claim

that defendant's counsel did not call certain witnesses for the
defense and that defendant's counsel did not file any pre-trial
motions.
Fred Metos, defendant's counsel who was instrumental in
obtaining this appeal, raised the following additional issue on,f
appeal:
6.

The state's failure to prove the intent necessary to

convict the defendant of attempted murder.
An examination of the record on appeal reveals an issue
raised by defense counsel at the time of trial, as follows:
7.

Evidence was admitted in state's case in chief

concerning defendant's prior criminal record.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a the verdict of guilty rendered by the
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, sitting with a jury, on July 22nd,
1981,

The defendant was found guilty on two counts of attempted

criminal homicide, attempted murder in the first degree.

The

defendant waived his time for sentencing and was sentenced on
each count to a term in the Utah State Prison not less than five
years and maybe for life, plus one year for the use of firearm to
run consecutively.

The sentences on the two counts were ordered

to run concurrently.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the 8th day of May, 1981, the defendant, J.D. Collier,
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was arraigned in Circuit Court on two charges oi attempted
criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, in violation of
§76-5-202(e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended).

The

defendant was bound over at a preliminary hearing held on May 18,
1981, and defendant entered a not guilty plea on May 22, 1981, in
the District Court of Weber County, State of Utah.

The defendant

appeared for a jury trial before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on
July 20, 21 and 22, 1981.

Defendant, at that trial, was

represented by Maurice Richards of the Public Defender
Association.
Prior to the commencement of the trial on July 20, 1981, a
conference was held in chambers at which time the following items
were discussed.
The prosecutor for the State of Utah stated that he intended
to present evidence concerning two felony warrants that were
outstanding on the defendant on May 7, 1981, evidence that he was
an escapee from the Utah State Prison on that date and evidence
that there was another outstanding warrant out of North Ogden on
the same date.

(R.110)

The defendant's counsel strenuously

objected to admitting any of this evidence, as it would
constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights
under the Fifth Amendment.

The defendant's counsel further

stated that the defendant does not intend to testify, however, if
the state introduced this evidence he would be forced to testify
to explain the circumstances surrounding his felony status.
(R.112 and 113)

Counsel for defendant also objected to the

admittance of the above described evidence or the basis that it
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was improper under the then existing Utah Rules of Evidence in
that it is impeaching the defendant's character before he brings
character into issue.

(R.lll and 339-344)

The court overruled

the defendant's objections and allowed the evidence to be
presented to the jury.

(R.117, 159, 354 and 374)

The prosecutor, again in chambers, represented to the court
that he intended to introduce evidence into trial, that a number
of confidential informants had told various police officers that
the defendant was in town, was using drugs, was dangerous and had
said that he would not be taken alive.

The state intended to

introduce this evidence solely through the testimony of the
police officers to whom the confidential informants had spoken
and did not intend to either divulge the names of these
informants, or call them to the stand.

Defendant's counsel

objected to the entry of any of this testimony into evidence on
the grounds that it was hearsay, not within any of the exceptions
of the hearsay rule, and furthermore, that it was violating the
defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, which gives the defendant a right to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.

(R.118-121 and 124)

The court again overruled the defendant's objection to this
evidence and allowed it to be presented to the jury.
160-167, 274, and 275)

(R.121,

At this time, defense counsel moved to

exclude all witnesses from the courtroom and asked them to be
instructed and not to discuss their testimony between themselves.
(R.126 and 130)
The jury was brought into the courtroom and the evidence was
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presented to the jury as follows:

On the afternoon of May 7,

1981, police officers, acting in compliance to information
received from confidential informants surrounded a mobile home
located at 3860 Midland Drive, Roy, Utah.

(R.256)

Confidential

informants had apparently told the officers that the defendant
was located in this house, that he was using drugs, and that he
was armed and dangerous.

(R.160-167, 274, and 275)

A number of

police officers commenced a stake out of the house.

(R. 256)

These officers were mostly in unmarked vehicles and dressed in
civilian clothing rather than in uniforms.
292, 378, and 597)

(R.257, 259, 288,

The defendant testified that during this

period of time he was using painkilling medication to treat the
symptoms of some rotten teeth and he was counteracting the
drowsiness these painkillers caused by using speed.

(R.592)

He

testified that due to the combination of drugs which he was
taking, he was in a wide awake drunken state.

(R.594)

At some point, the defendant and another individual left the
house.

They were pursued by two or three police officers, none

of whom were in uniform and all of whom were carrying shot guns.
(R.259 and 595)

One of the officers, Officer Turner, followed

the defendant, an individual by the name of Hansen and one other
individual, for a short time.

He then, without identifying

himself as a police officer, told Hansen to stop.
596)

(R.285 and

Hansen went down on the ground and the defendant took off

running, thinking he was being set up for a robbery.

(R.286)

The defendant took off across the field and, at some point in
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time, shots were fired in the defendant's direction.

There is a

discrepancy in the testimony concerning exactly when these
initial shots were fired, however, they were fired either while
the defendant was in the field or shortly after he ran up to a
parked telephone company van.

(R.598, 265, 689 and 692)

The

defendant entered the telephone van that was parked on the side
of the road.

Either before he got into the van or shortly

thereafter, the tires of van were shot out by Officer Watts who *
was shooting a shotgun loaded with double 00 buckshot.
206 and 5 98)

(R.187,

At some point during the scenario, the defendant

was wounded in the head by one of the shots from the officer's
guns.

Evidence is not clear exactly when the defendant was hit.

(R.268, 407, 482 and 525)

However, the defendant testified that

he was hit shortly upon arriving at the van.

(R.602)

Shortly

after the tires were shot out on the van, three canisters of tear
gas were exploded in the van.

(R.266, 350 and 602)

At this

point, both uniformed and civilian clothed officers began
approaching the van, however, the defendant testified that he, at
no time, saw any uniformed officers near the van.

There is

conflicting testimony as to conversations between the officers
and the defendant while sitting in the van.

Officers Watts and

Lui testified that the defendant recognized the individuals as
police officers and called them pigs.

Officer Call, in his

police report, had no mention of the word pig, however, testified
later that he remembered that the defendant had said that.
(R.692)

The defendant himself testified that he, at no time,

recognized the individuals were police officers until after he
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had started the vehicle moving.

There 5s further testimony that

while the officers were chasing the defendant through the field
and while they were surrounding the van, that the defendant had
ample opportunity to shoot the officers but at no time took a
shot.

(R.348, 476 and 613)

At some point, the defendant then

started the van and, with some effort, began driving down the
road in the van, which at that point had three flat tires.

As

the defendant proceeded in the van down the road toward a police
road block, there was a number of shots fired both from the van
as well as from the police officers at the defendant.
327)

(R.506 and

At this time, the defendant shot several rounds in the

vicinity of a couple of the officers.

Officer Call testified

that one of these shots actually hit him in the elbow.

This

wound was a very superficial wound requiring no medication.
(R.466, 557 and 330)

Officer Hammond then shot two rounds of

double 00 buckshot through the front windshield of the van.
(R.508)

The van finally came to a halt, the police jumped in and

pulled the defendant out, knocked the defendant to the concrete
and discovered that the defendant had a wound on his head and was
semi-conscious.

(R.268, 337, 405 and 226)

The defendant was

then arrested, taken to the hospital for treatment of his wounds
and was subsequently charged with the offenses of attempted
criminal homicide.
During the course of the trial, Officer Hammond testified
that a blood test was taken of the defendant and that there were
no traces of drugs or alcohol in the defendant's blood system and
that there was a written report of this. (R.526)

Officer Hammond
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was then recalled during defendant's case and testified that he
had misstated himself and that there were no written reports of
drugs or alcohol on the defendant,

(R.686)

During the prosecutor's questioning of Officer Lui, during
which time the witness exclusion rule was in effect, Officer
Lui's testimony suggested that he and Officer Watts had discussed
Watt's testimony.

While a witness on the stand, Officer Lui was

asked:
Q:

Could you hear that response?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Was it directly responsive to the statement that you had

made "Throw your gun down and come on out"?
A:

Yes, it was.

Q:

What was the response that you got at that time?

A:

Well, it was kind of a bad response.

Q:

The same response that Officer Watts testified to?

A:

Yes, it is.

Q:

Okay.

Mr. Richards:

I object to this.

How did the witness know

this unless he was out talking to Officer Watts?
The Court:
Mr. Daines:

The objection is correct.
I think it is too, Your Honor.

At this point, the defendant's counsel, Mr. Richards
requested that that witness be excused and not called.

The

court, however, allowed the continuation of his testimony.
(R.310, 311)
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, the jury retired,
deliberated for approximately one hour and returned with a
verdict of guilty to both counts.

(R.713-715)

The defendant

waived his time for sentencing and was sentenced to a term in the
Utah State Prison of not less than five years but maybe for life,
plus one year for the use of a firearm.

(R.69)

The defendant personally filed a notice of appeal on May 1,
1985, appealing this conviction.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Deirdre A. Gorman, attorney for defendant, is submitting
this brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 LEd.2d 493, (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).

Counsel's submission is therefore, that

the issues raised by defendant are not substantive and probably
do not warrant reversal of the conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID VIOLATION OF THE COURT'S ORDER EXCLUDING
WITNESSES CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom during a trial
is addressed in §78-7-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended),
which provides, in relevant part, "And in any cause, the court
may, in it's discretion during the examination of a witness
exclude any and all other witnesses in the cause."
The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom, pursuant to
this section, has been addressed specifically in regards to
criminal trials in several recent Supreme Court decisions.

In
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the case of State v. Carlson, 635 P.2a 72 (Utah 1981), the court
was presented with a factual situation as follows.

In this case

the defendant was on trial for a charge of possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute.

The defense

counsel moved, and the court granted, a motion excluding
witnesses from the courtroom.

During the course of the trial,

several of the state's witnesses were overheard talking together
with the prosecutor concerning various aspects of the case.
Later in the case, some of these tainted witnesses were called to
further testify and the defense attorney lodged an objection.
The court overruled the objection and permitted the testimony of
these witnesses to be presented to the jury.

The Supreme Court

affirmed the trial court's decision,stating, "That it will not
disturb any decision within the discretion of the trial court
unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion."
(Id at 74)
See also, State v. Sanchez, 611 P.2c 721 (Utah 1980), where
the court went even further in holding that "Unless some such
good cause or justification appears, this interdiction should not
prohibit counsel for either side from talking to the witnesses."
(Id at 722.)
In the present case, there is evidence in the transcript of
several of the officers talking outside of the courtroom during
the period of time that this order excluding witnesses was in
effect.

There is an also an assertion by the defendant in his

writ of habeas corpus that the prosecutor was seen during the
course of the trial talking to several of his witnesses during
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the recesses or breaks.

However, under the rulings of the recent

cases cited above, such conduct would not constitute reversible
error.
POINT II
DID THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO INTRODUCE
CERTAIN EVIDENCE INTO TRIAL CONSTITUTE
SUPPRESSION OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO FORK A REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION.
The defendant in his writ of habeas corpus makes claims that
the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence.

The items he

refers to are articles of clothing worn by the defendant,
expended shell casings, departmental shooting reports, a
description of what type of gun each officer was using, failure
to identify who shot the defendant, failure to identify when the
defendant was shot, suppression of statements made by officers
not testifying in trial and suppression of blood and urine
toxicology statements.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Weather Ford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 51 LEd.2d 30, 97 S.Ct. 37, (1977), held
"There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case." (Id at 559)
The State of Utah has, however, provided certain rights of
discovery in a criminal trial.

In §77-35-16(a)(4), Utah Code

Annotated, 1953 (as amended), there is a provision that the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense, upon request, material
which includes, "evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the
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defendant or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced
punishment.
The U.S. Supreme Court has further established a parameter
of discovery rights under the United States Constitution.

In the

case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 LEd.2d 215, 83 S.Ct.
1194, (1963), the Supreme Court stated, "We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request, violates due process where the evidence is
material either to the guilt or punishment irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."

(1^3 at 87, emphasis

added.)
The U.S. Court of Appeals, in the case of U.S.. v. Mackin,
569 F.2d 958 at 961 (C.A.D.C. 1977), held, "A new trial will not
be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence unless that
evidence would probably produce an acquittal upon retrial."
The standard, therefore, applied in determining whether or
not the suppression of evidence would warrant a reversal is
whether that evidence is material, whether that evidence, if
introduced at trial, would probably produce an acquittal upon
retrial.

In the present case, this standard is simply not met.

In the present case, there was no question that the
defendant was present and the defendant fire some shots out of a
gun which he possessed.

The empty shell cartridges and the

articles of clothing that defendant wore, therefore, would not be
material for the defense.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that

these items were suppressed since no request to produce these
items was made during the course of the trial.

The same
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reasoning would apply as to a description as to caliber gun each
of the officers fired.

It was a definite issue at trial as to

exactly who shot the defendant and when that shooting occurred.
The state argued that the evidence pointed to the defendant being
shot by Officer Hammond immediately before the van was brought to
a halt.

Counsel for the defense questioned several of the

witnesses in an attempt to show that the defendant was shot
earlier in the scenario, thereby rendering him incapable of
formulating the requisite criminal intent.

The failure of the

prosecutor to establish exactly when he was shot, therefore,
would be more detrimental to the state's case than it would be to
the defense.
There is no evidence in the record as to suppression of
statements made by officers not testifying at trial.

It appears

from the transcript that the majority of the officers at the
scene were put on the stand at one time or another.

The

defendant's claim that the police suppressed evidence regarding
the blood and urine samples of the defendant again is negated by
the trial transcript.

During the state's case in chief, Officer

Hammond testified that there was a blood test taken on the
defendant but no traces of drug or alcohol were found in the
defendant's system.

The officer stated there were written

reports from the hospital to this effect.

Officer Hammond was

recalled during defendant's case and corrected himself by
testifying that actually no reports concerning the drug or
alcohol content of the defendant at the time of the incident,
were issued.

This testimony does not appear to be a perjury
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which might warrant a new tria] but a misstatement of facts which
the officer corrected.

The officer, in his testimony, was very

clear that in his opinion the defendant acted as though he was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol when they got him out of
the car.

The record does not reflect, in this instance, grounds

for reversal on the basis that the prosecutor suppressed
exculpatory evidence.
POINT III
WAS PERJURED TESTIMONY USED IN OBTAINING A
CONVICTION ON DEFENDANT.
The defendant in his writ of habeas corpus claimed that the
prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony of two officers.

He

claims that Officer Hammond and Officer Call both committed
perjury on the stand and this perjury was material in obtaining a
conviction of the defendant.
Officer Hammond, as stated above, testified that he had
written results from a blood test of the defendant that should no
alcohol or drug residue in the defendant's system at the time of
the offense.

During cross-examination, Officer Hammond was asked

to bring in the written report.

He later corrected himself by

saying that there actually was no written report as to the drug
or alcohol content of the defendant's blood.
Officer Call testified as to some comments the defendant
made during short conversations with the police during the period
while he was under attack by the police.

These went beyond what

was contained in his police reports and this point was brought
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out in cross-examination of the officer on pages 689-692 of the
record on appeal.
In both instances, it is arguable whether or not the
witnesses intentionally committed perjury or whether they simply
could not fully remember the facts during their testimony.

In

both cases, the discrepancies were brought out by defense counsel
and in both cases, defense counsel made a point of the change of
testimony.

The cross-examination techniques of defense counsel,

therefore, directly attacked the credibility of these two
witnesses due to the discrepancies in their testimony.

It can be

argued either way that the prejudicial effect of these statements
was successfully nullified.
correct.

There is no way to know which is

It could be argued that catching the officers in clear

misstatements might have benefited the defendant.

In any event,

the jury had these points clearly before it.
POINT IV
WERE THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION VIOLATED BY THE FAILURE
TO LET HIM CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS.
During the state's case in chief, they called Officer Randy
Watts to the stand to testify concerning the offense with which
the defendant is charged.

Officer Watts testified that an

unnamed confidential informant informed him that the defendant
was staying in the house, that he was armed and would not be
taken alive.

Officer Watts relied upon this information and

surrounded the house where the defendant was eventually found.

-16-

Counsel for the defendant objected numerous times to the
entry of this information into evidence on two grounds.

First,

that it was a violation of a hearsay rule, and second, that it
was in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.

The court overruled

defense objections and allowed the testimony into evidence.
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in the
State of McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.300, 18 LEd.2d 62, 87 S.Ct.
1056, (1967).

In that case, the Court was presented with a

situation in which a confidential informant told the police
officers that an individual had drugs on his person.

The

officers stopped the individual, searched him and found some
drugs.

The defendant moved to suppress evidence and during the

suppression hearing requested the identity and presence of this
confidential informant.

The Court denied the motion, thereby

allowing the anonymity of the confidential informant.

In an

appeal claiming that the defendant's rights under the Sixth
Amendment were violated, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution does not give a defendant in a
criminal trial the right to the identity of a confidential
informant nor the right to cross-examine that informant
concerning matters told to the police.
In^the McCray decision, the Court stated in relevant part,
"If the claim is that the state violated
the Sixth Amendment by not producing the
informer to testify against the petitioner,
then we need no more than repeat the Court's
answer to that claim a few weeks ago
in Cooper v. California, 'Petitioner also
presents contention here that he was
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unconstitutionally deprived of the right
to confront a witness against him because
the state did not produce the informant to
testify against him. This contention we
consider absolutely devoid of merit.1
On the other hand, the claim may be that
the petitioner was deprived his Sixth
Amendment right to cross-examine the
arresting officers themselves because a
refusal to reveal the informer's identity
was upheld. It would follow from this
argument that no witness on cross-examination
could ever constitutionally assert a
testimonial privilege, including the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
guaranteed by the constitution itself. We
have never given the Sixth Amendment such
a construction and we decline to do so now."
(Id at 313 and 314)
See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 17 LEd.2d 730,
87 S.Ct. 788 (1967).
The law, therefore, is clear that the defendant, in the
present case, has no constitutional claim on this issue.
POINT V
WAS DEFENDANT INEFFECTIVELY REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL.
The defendant, again in his writ of habeas corpus, requests
that his conviction be reversed on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

His claims are based on the assertion

that counsel did not call certain witnesses for his defense and
that counsel did not present any pre-trial motions.
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
ineffective representation of counsel most recently in the case
of

State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982).

The Court, in that

case, held "Trial tactics lie within the prerogative of counsel
and may not be dictated by his client.

Decisions as to what
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witnesses to call, what objections to make, and by and large,
what defenses to interpose are generally left to the professional
judgment of counsel."

(I_d at 91)

The Utah Supreme Court has further held in the case of State
v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utah 1978) that, "To show inadequate or
ineffective counsel, the record must establish that counsel was
ignorant of the facts or the law resulting in withdrawal of a
crucial defense reducing the trial to a 'farce and a sham1."

(Id

at 70-71)
In the case at hand, there is no showing of such ignorance
of facts or law.

A careful reading of the trial transcript will

show that counsel for the defendant throughout the trial was
competent and, in some points, brilliant.

His objections were

timely, his cross-examination of state's witnesses was
productive, and he had a thorough grasp of both the law and the
facts of this particular case.
The defendant further clctims that the defense counsel had a
conflict of interest in that he represented one or a number of
the state's witnesses.

Since the state's witnesses were all

police officers, it is quite unlikely, and there is no evidence
in the record of such conflict.
In any event, there is no evidence whatsoever in the record
as to ineffective assistance of counsel.
POINT VI
DID THE DEFENDANT POSSESS THE INTENT NECESSARY
TO CONVICT HIM OF ATTEMPTED MURDER.
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§76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as
murder in the first degree.

amended), defines

§76-5-202(1) states, "Criminal

homicide constitutes murder in tl le first deqree it the actor
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under the
following circumstances."

{emphasis added)

the elements of an attempt, which wo;;

§76-4-101 defines

.:

/. the present

case.
Under these statutes, therefore, in order to find an
individual guilty of this offense, it must hi- proved that he
intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the death of
another.

If no intent is proved, then the defendant must be

found not guilty or, in the alternative, guilty of a lessor
included offense.

The determination of whether the defendant

possessed this requisite criminal knowledge or intent is a
determination that is to be made by the jury.

Furthermore, under

Utah law, a person must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of each element of the offense which would, in this case,
include the element of knowing or intentional.

§76-1-501, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended).
The Supreme Court is generally hesitant to reverse a lower
court's conviction of an individual on the basis of insufficient
evidence.

This reluctancy is expressed in State v. Newbold, 581

P.2d 991 (Utah 1972), where the Court held, "To set aside a jury
verdict, evidence must appear so inconclusive and unsatisfactory
that reasonable minds acting fairly upon it must have entertained
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime."
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A reversal of the verdict in the present case would require
that evidence as to the defendant's knowledge or intent was
totally inconclusive and unsatisfactory, or it would require a
showing that the jury did not address that issue.

In the present

case, however, there is ample; evidence that the jury addressed
this issue.

The court instructed the jury in instructions number

6, 11, 13, 14 and 15 that the crime charged is one* that required
proof of specific intent before the defendant could be convicted.
The jury, in this case, retired to deliberate after having been
instructed by the judge of these intent requirements and,
furthermore, they retired to the jury room with a copy of the
jury instructions.

The evidence as presented at trial could

clearly support the finding of such intent.

The record contains

testimony supporting the state's contention that the defendant's
an escaped felony, was trying to escape from the law officers and
that he had a gun with him and, on two occasions tried to shoot
the officers.

Therefore, the requirement of inconclusiveness

necessary for a reversal, cannot be found in this case.
POINT VII
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION
BY ALLOWING TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE DEFENDANT'S
PRIOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY INTO EVIDENCE.
The defendant was brought to trial on these charges in July
of 1981 and, at that time, the court was governed by the former
Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states in relevant
part that "Evidence of specific instances of conduct other than
evidence of conviction of a crime which tends to prove the trait
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to be bad shall be inadmissable" unless " the accused has
introduced evidence of his good character."
Rule 55 goes further to state
"Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person
committed a crime or civil wrong on a
specified occasion is inadmissable to prove
his disposition to commit crime or civil
wrong as the basis for the inference that
he committed another crime or civil wrong
on another specified occasion. But subject
to Rules 45 and 4 8 such evidence is
admissable when relevant to prove some
other material fact, including absence of
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or
identity."
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed this issue in the case
of State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978).

In that case, the

Court held,
"this Court has stated on numerous occasions
that evidence of other crimes allegedly
committed by the defendant is not admissable
if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant
as a person of evil character with a
propensity... to commit crime and thus likely
to have committed the crime charged. However,
if the evidence has relevency to explain
circumstances surrounding the instant crime,
it is admissable for that purpose and the
fact that it may tend to connect a defendant
with another crime will not render it incompetent."
(.Id at 882)
In the Daniels case, the Court affirmed the lower court's
ruling admitting evidence of prior bad conduct on the basis that
it was relevant to explain the circumstances surrounding the
instant crime.
See also State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977), where
the court held, "Nevertheless if the evidence has relevance and
probative value relating to his commission of the crime charged,
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the fact that it shows commission of another crime does not
render it incompetent."

(Ijd at 786)

In the present case, during the state's case in chief,
evidence was presented through several of the state's witnesses
concerning outstanding felony warrants against the defendants,
and evidence concerning the fact that the defendant had recently
escaped from the Utah State Prison.

The court overruled defense

counsel's objections that this evidence was inadmissable as part
of the res gestae.

Under the circumstances of the case, the

decisions in State v. Daniels and State v. Gibson would be
directly controlling concerning the admissability of the
defendant's prior criminal record.
CONCLUSION
Counsel for defendant asks that this Court make a full
examination of the proceedings and then rule on counsel's motion
to withdraw.
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